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Introduction
In 1999, President Clinton called racial profiling "morally
indefensible."1 Ten years later, President Obama said it is a problem that
"stills haunts us" as an American society.2 After President Obama
commented on the incident between Sergeant James Crowley and Professor
Henry Louis Professor Gates, a discussion regarding racial profiling in
America invoked national attention.3 Although President Obama did not
specifically use the term "racial profiling," his remarks were generally
understood as alluding to racial profiling because of his reference to the fact

1. Steven A. Holmes, Clinton Orders Investigation on Possible Racial Profiling,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1999, at A2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
1999/06/10/us/clinton-orders-investigation-on-possible-racial-profiling.html
("Declaring racial profiling ‘morally indefensible,’ President Clinton today ordered Federal
law-enforcement agencies to compile data on the race and ethnicity of people they question,
search or arrest to determine whether suspects are stopped because of the color of their
skin.").
2. See Krissah Thompson, Obama Addresses Race and Louis Gates Incident, WASH.
POST, July 23, 2009, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/22/AR2009072203800.html ("President Obama said Wednesday
night that race still haunts America, even as he noted ‘the incredible progress that has been
made.’").
3. See Helene Cooper, Obama Criticizes Arrest of Harvard Professor, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2009, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/politics/
23gates.html ("‘There’s a long history in this country of African-Americans being stopped
disproportionately by the police,’ Mr. Obama said.") "It’s a sign of how race remains a
factor in this society." Id. When speaking of the incident involving Professor Gates,
President Obama initially said:
No. 1, any of us would have been pretty angry; No. 2, that the Cambridge police
acted stupidly in arresting somebody when there was already proof that they
were in their own home; and No. 3, what I think we know separate and apart
from this incident is there is a long history in this country of African-Americans
and Latinos being stopped by police disproportionately. That’s just a fact. Id.
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that minorities were disproportionately stopped when compared to whites.4
Statistics show that within the criminal justice system, the disproportionate
rate at which minorities are arrested and prosecuted plays a pivotal role in
making racial profiling an issue.5 A variety of studies reveals that members
of racial minority groups, in particular Blacks and Hispanics, could be
overexposed to harmful action from beginning to end in the American
criminal justice system.6 One commentator concluded that President
Obama all but blamed the police department for racial profiling in the
Professor Gates and Sergeant Crowley eruption;7 however, President
Obama’s statements implicitly suggest that Hispanics and African
Americans are quite familiar with the act of racial profiling by law
enforcement officers.8 President Obama is also on record as suggesting that
both Professor Gates and Sergeant Crowley may have "overreacted."9
I. Police Investigate Apparent Break-In at Professor Gates’ Home
On July 16, 2009, Lucia Whalen, a white woman, placed a call to the
police reporting that two men appeared to be breaking into a house in her
neighborhood.10 Cambridge police officers were dispatched to the scene to
4. See id. and accompanying text (discussing President Obama’s remarks about the
racial incident involving Professor Gates).
5. See David Gillborn, Risk-Free Racism: Whiteness and So-Called "Free Speech,"
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 537–39 (2009) (discussing the disproportionate arrests and
prosecutions of minorities, particularly African Americans, in both the United States and the
United Kingdom).
6. See id. at 539 ("[T]he [United States] government has also acknowledged that
‘various studies indicate that members of minorities (especially Blacks and Hispanics) may
be disproportionately subject to adverse treatment throughout the criminal justice process.’"
(citing Amnesty Int’l, Racism and the Administration of Justice, AI Index AFR 40/020/2001,
July 23, 2001)).
7. See Cooper, supra note 3, at A20 ("President Obama bluntly accused the police of
acting ‘stupidly’ in arresting the Harvard scholar Henry Louis Gates Jr. last week after an
officer had established that Mr. Gates had not broken into his own home in Cambridge,
Mass.").
8. See id. ("[President Obama] added that African-Americans and Hispanics in the
United States have long been familiar with racial profiling by law enforcement.").
9. See Michael A. Fletcher & Michael D. Shear, Obama Voices Regret to Policeman:
He Moves to Dampen Racial Controversy, WASH. POST, June 25, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2009/07/24/AR2009072400451.html
("The president said he continues to think the arrest was an ‘overreaction’ by the officer, but
he said Gates ‘probably overreacted as well.’").
10. See Robert Z. Nemeth, A Moment Not Teachable, WORCESTER TELEGRAM &
GAZETTE (MA), Aug. 9, 2009, at A12 (stating that "Lucia Whalen, a concerned
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investigate the possible break-in.11 During the investigation Sergeant James
Crowley approached the door of Professor Gates’ home and asked him to
step outside after informing Professor Gates, a black male, that he was at
the residence to investigate a crime.12 In the police report filed by Sergeant
Crowley, he stated that once he arrived at the home, he asked Professor
Gates to step out on the porch and speak to him, to which Professor Gates
replied, "No I will not."13 According to the police report, Professor Gates
demanded to know who Sergeant Crowley was and why he was on his
property.14 While Sergeant Crowley explained to Professor Gates that he
was there to "investigat[e] a report of a break in,"15 Professor Gates opened
the door and accused Officer Sergeant Crowley of being there because he
was a "[B]lack man in America."16
After Sergeant Crowley entered into Professor Gates’ residence, he
requested identification from Professor Gates to assist him in his
investigation of the alleged break-in.17 Sergeant Crowley stated that he was
very surprised and confused by the attitude Professor Gates exhibited
towards him.18 Apparently, because of Sergeant Crowley’s surprise
regarding Professor Gates attitude towards him, Sergeant Crowley asked
citizen . . . alerted police of a possible break-in").
11. See Sally Kalson, Looking to Impart a Lesson; Obama, Professor, Officer Get
Together for ‘Teachable Moment,’ PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 30, 2009, at A1
(stating that "Sgt. James Crowley and several other Cambridge police officers arrived [at Dr.
Gates’ house] and began to question Dr. Gates").
12. See JAMES CROWLEY, CAMBRIDGE POLICE DEP’T., INCIDENT REPORT #9005127
(July 16, 2009), available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/file/henry-louis-gates-jrpolice-report?page=0 (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice) (stating Crowley said, "I could see an older black
male standing in the foyer . . . . [so I identified myself as] Sgt. Crowly from the Cambridge
Police . . . [and told him that I was] ‘investigating a report of a break in progress’ at the
residence").
13. See id. ("As I [Crowley] stood in plain view of this man, later identified as Gates, I
asked if he would step out onto the porch and speak with me. He replied ‘no I will not.’").
14. See id. (stating that Professor Gates "demanded to know who [Sergeant Crowley]
was").
15. Id.
16. See id. (describing that while Crowley explained that his business for being at
Gates’ residence was to investigate a possible break-in, "Gates opened the front door and
exclaimed ‘why, because I’m a black man in America?’").
17. See id. (reporting that Crowley said, "I asked Gates to provide me with photo
identification so that I could verify that he resided at Ware Street and so that I could radio
my findings to [the police department]").
18. See id. (explaining that Crowley declared, "I was quite surprised and confused
with the behavior he exhibited toward me").
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that Professor Gates produce a form of identification so that he could
confirm that he resided there and radio it in to the police department in
preparation for his departure from Professor Gates’ home.19 Professor
Gates initially refused to provide identification but then offered up his
Harvard identification card.20 The moment Sergeant Crowley verified that
Professor Gates was indeed lawfully in his home, there was neither
probable cause nor a reasonable suspicion that Professor Gates was the
individual suspected of breaking and entering into his residence.21 One
would reasonably assume that the minute Sergeant Crowley dismissed his
suspicion regarding Professor Gates and criminal activity, the investigatory
communication between the two men would come to an uneventful end.22
After Sergeant Crowley dismissed his suspicion regarding the break-in, he
may have remained at Professor Gates’ house because Professor Gates
demanded that he identify himself.23 Sergeant Crowley stated in his police
report that Professor Gates accused him of being a racist police officer.24
Sergeant Crowley believed he had probable cause to arrest Professor Gates
for disorderly conduct because he was offended by Professor Gates’ loud
and offensive speech.25 The disorderly conduct charges were properly
dismissed even if Professor Gates engaged in disrespectful speech.26 The
disorderly conduct charge against Professor Gates would later be dismissed,
but the incident sparked a national debate about racial profiling.27
19. See CROWLEY, supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text (describing how
Crowley asked Gates for identification).
20. See id. (stating that "Gates initially refused [to provide identification,] demanding
that [Crowley] show him identification but then did supply . . . a Harvard University
identification card").
21. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (stating that Crowley’s duty to
investigate ended after Professor Gates provided identification because appropriate
identification removed any reasonable suspicion that Gates was a possible criminal intruder).
22. See infra notes 63–81 and accompanying text (stating the limitations of reasonable
suspicion and that once the suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, the investigation terminates).
23. See id. (stating Gates demanded Crowley’s name three times and Crowley told
him, but when Gates demanded his name a fourth time, Crowley "told Gates that I would
speak with him outside").
24. See id. ("As I [Crowley] descended the stairs [of Gates’s residence] to the
sidewalk, Gates continued to yell at me, accusing me of racial bias and continued to tell me I
had not heard the last of him.").
25. See id. (describing that Gates exhibited a "tumultuous manner," had repeatedly
accused Crowley of being a racist police officer, and had been warned twice by Crowley to
calm down because he was becoming disorderly before Crowley arrested Gates).
26. See Kalson, supra note 11, at A1 ("Sgt. Crowley arrested Dr. Gates for disorderly
conduct, but prosecutors quickly dropped the charges.").
27. See, e.g., Kalson, supra note 11, at A1 (discussing whether "the incident merely
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In Part II, I explain the concept of racial profiling and the right not to
be targeted by the police because of one’s race.28 In Part III, I explain how
the initial questioning of Professor Gates at his home was permitted under
the Fourth Amendment because a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
was present under the circumstances.29 In Part IV, I discuss why the
disorderly conduct charge against Professor Gates was properly dismissed
because speaking to a police officer in a hostile voice is protected by the
First Amendment.30 Part V of this Article reveals that a police officer filing
a false police report under a Massachusetts’s law regarding the race of a
potential African-American suspect is not a crime unless the statement was
false regarding racial profiling as a material matter.31 Part VI of the Article
provides a summary of the lesson we can learn from the issues discussed in
this Article.32
II. The Concept of Racial Profiling Involves Race Conscious Targeting
Racial profiling is by definition race conscious targeting.33 Racial
profiling is an intentional discriminatory routine.34 African Americans are
the chief targets in the racial profiling system.35 One commentator asserts
hardened people’s preconceptions [about racial profiling,] or has it shown them something
they didn’t realize about how the real world operates").
28. See infra notes 33–62 and accompanying text (discussing the discrimination of
racial profiling, race conscious targeting, and Fourth Amendment rights).
29. See infra notes 63–112 and accompanying text (describing that Gates’ behavior
allowed Crowley to question Gates because there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity on the premises and citing cases to support this).
30. See infra notes 113–134 and accompanying text (citing cases supporting First
Amendment rights of free speech in the context of the disorderly conduct charge).
31. See infra notes 135–186 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts law
about the subject of racial profiling and how it would apply to Crowley’s report).
32. See infra Part V (suggesting how to counter racial profiling: "In order to close the
racial divide on the issue of racial profiling, it is necessary to provide sensitive training to all
Americans").
33. See Allison A. Hendrix, Reinforcing Batson Defining the Peculiar: Racial
Profiling as an Impermissible Ground for Peremptory Challenge, 44 No. 5 CRIM. L. BULL.
691, 695 (2008) ("Racial profiling is defined as ‘the law enforcement practice of using race,
national origin, or ethnicity as a salient basis for suspicion of criminal activity.’" (citing
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (8th ed. 2004))).
34. See id. at 695–96 (discussing the routineness of law enforcement officers
investigating on the basis of race alone).
35. See id. at 695 ("African-Americans remain the primary victims of racial profiling."
(citing Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in the
Selective Enforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 722
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that usually racial profiling may be described as thinking of a person as a
suspect because of a stereotypical perception that people identified with that
individual’s racial classification are expected to perform the kind of crime
under examination.36 The expression "racial profiling" as a general matter
does not apply to an examination of a specific crime once an injured party
or bystander has recognized the race of the alleged criminal and law
enforcement officers use race as a factor while making determinations
regarding which suspicious persons to target for interrogation.37 Racial
profiling has proven to be an unsuccessful tool because statistics fail to
show a relevant relationship involving race and crime.38 Unfortunately,
racial profiling is a function of our popular culture as well as general
stereotypes regarding race.39 As a result, cultural stereotypes involving
racial profiling are complicated issues for the law to remedy.40 The arrest
of Harvard University Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. motivated many
people to openly discuss the enduring, ugly truth presented by the practice
of racial profiling.41 There is a growing consensus that racial profiling
(2004))).
36. See Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Margaret B. Kwoka, Title VI Disparate Impact
Claims Would Not Harm National Security—A Response to Paul Taylor, 46 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 503, 522–23 (2009) ("Most commonly, racial profiling refers to treating an individual
differently based upon the belief that members of that person’s racial or ethnic group are
more likely to commit the type of crime being investigated." (citing Kevin R. Johnson,
Racial Profiling After September 11: The Department of Justice’s 2003 Guidelines, 50 LOY.
L. REV. 67, 79 (2004)).
37. See id. at 523 ("The term racial profiling is not typically used to describe an
investigation of a particular crime where a victim or witness has identified the race of the
perpetrator, and the police consider race in decisions about which suspects to question or
otherwise investigate." (citing DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 49 (New Press 2003)).
38. See id. at 524–25 ("The most commonly studied racial profiling context is the
practice of pretextual traffic stops, where the true reason for the stop is not the minor traffic
violation, but that the driver is black." (citing Deborah Ramirez et al., Defining Racial
Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1211 (2003)). "This
practice exists despite the fact that ‘no data demonstrates [sic] either a general or a
circumstantial correlation between race and crime.’" Id.
39. See Neil Gotanda, Computer Games, Racial Pleasure, and Discursive Racial
Spaces, 72 ALB. L. REV. 929, 935 (2009) ("Based upon the target person’s body and cultural
configuration (dress, style, language), the profiler selects a racial profile from available
popular culture and ‘common sense’ racial understandings." (citing Neil Gotanda, New
Directions in Asian American Jurisprudence, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. (forthcoming Summer
2009)).
40. See id. ("The controversies surrounding racial profiling in law enforcement
reinforce the idea that cultural factors are not easily modified by such traditional avenues as
statutory reforms or judicial decisions.").
41. See M.K.B. Darmer, Teaching Whren to White Kids, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 109,
110 (2009) (stating the arrest of Professor Gates "has revivified conversations regarding
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violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection principle in theory,42
but in fact, it is virtually impossible to prove racial profiling as a
constitutional violation because of the Supreme Court’s discriminatory
intent requirement.43 If the Equal Protection Clause is the sole remedy for
racial profiling by the police, the Supreme Court has granted AfricanAmerican criminal defendants a very challenging equal protection right it
knows is very difficult to enforce.44
"Racial profiling" is also defined as actions by police officers or other
government officials in enforcing laws based on racial stereotyping, rather
than the "reasonable suspicion" or "probable cause" standard.45 Probable
cause is present when an officer acting as a reasonable person has enough
facts to think that a crime occurred or is taking place.46 On the other hand,
race-consciousness" and "also called attention to the continuing reality of racial profiling").
42. See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the
Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1048 (2010) ("Racial profiling . . . runs counter to
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the law.").
43. See id. at 1049 ("The Court held [in Washington v. Davis] that discriminatory
intent must also be proved. Because it poses a formidable barrier to proving Equal
Protection claims, the discriminatory intent requirement has been the subject of sustained
scholarly criticism." (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235–36, 248 (1976);
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content
of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164–65 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,
319–21 (1987); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 808–09, 877–78 (2004); Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate
Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133 (2010))).
44. See id. at 1063 ("In holding that the Equal Protection Clause was the exclusive
remedy for a race-based pretextual stop based on probable cause for a violation of the traffic
laws, Whren v. United States failed to persuasively justify that conclusion.") "Moreover, it
left criminal defendants . . . with a toothless equal protection remedy that, more often than
not, will leave them with an unenforceable right." Id.
45. See DARIN D. FREDRICKSON & RAYMOND P. SILJANDER, RACIAL PROFILING:
ELIMINATING THE CONFUSION BETWEEN RACIAL AND CRIMINAL PROFILING AND CLARIFYING
WHAT CONSTITUTES UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AND PERSECUTION 15 (2002) ("Racial profiling
is a term that is generally understood to mean enforcement action on the part of police
officers that is motivated more by racial bias than by any reasonable suspicion or probable
cause that may exist under the circumstances.").
46. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009)
("‘Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within [an officer’s] knowledge
and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being
committed,’ and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in the place to be
searched." (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949))).
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reasonable suspicion is satisfied when there is a chance of finding evidence
of wrongdoing supported by clear and articulable facts.47 The Constitution
was designed to afford all Americans the right to be free from unreasonable
A Fourth
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.48
Amendment seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer or his agent
"terminates or restrains ones freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied" in order to display his authority.49 African
Americans contend their constitutional rights against unreasonable seizures
or searches are not respected in the criminal justice process.50
Race is often a key fact in the law enforcement assessment of whether
to investigate African Americans for criminal activity.51 The Constitution
makes it illegal for the police to investigate a person because of race.52
Nevertheless, public officials eager to demonstrate support for law and
order often unfairly target African Americans because of their race for
Racial profiling is the systematic,
criminalization and prison.53
unreasonable targeting of African Americans as engaging in suspicious
criminal behavior.54 Professor Weatherspoon has written an excellent
47. See id. ("[W]e have attempted to flesh out the knowledge component [known as
‘reasonable suspicion’] by looking to the degree to which known facts imply prohibited
conduct, the specificity of the information received, and the reliability of its source.") "At
the end of the day, however, we have realized that these factors cannot rigidly control, and
we have come back to saying that the standards are ‘fluid concepts that take their substantive
content from the particular contexts’ in which they are being assessed." Id. (citations
omitted).
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .").
49. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429, 434 (1991); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989)).
50. See Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in the
Selective Enforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 722
(2004) ("African-Americans feel that their constitutional rights have been marginalized by
the very systems in place to protect their rights.").
51. See id. at 723 ("Too often, race is the determinative factor used by law
enforcement officers to justify a stop and search of African-Americans."). "Even though the
Constitution prohibits such conduct by law enforcement agencies, these practices have
become the norm, not the exception." Id.
52. See id. (stating that the Constitution prohibits law enforcement officers from using
race as a determinative factor to justify a stop and search of African Americans).
53. See id. at 723–24 ("[I]n their zeal to enforce public laws, governmental officials
have selected African-Americans and other minorities solely on the basis of their race to
stop, arrest, charge, prosecute, and incarcerate." (citing PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (Feb. 2001))).
54. See id. at 725 ("Unfortunately, racial profiling of African-Americans appears to be
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article that focuses on how to reduce and ultimately eradicate official racial
profiling.55
Professor Weatherspoon argues that only a forceful
condemnation of race profiling by public officials will bring a timely end to
the tradition of race profiling of African Americans.56
Professor Gates’ statement, labeling Sergeant Crowley as a racist cop
without any substantial objective evidence, might be explained by his
subjective Black experience.57 In my view, Professor Gates’ subjective
Black experience initially suggested to him that he was targeted for an
unwelcomed police treatment at his home primarily because of his race.58
The Black experience, as well as relevant history, probably contributes to
the inability of some African Americans to separate the past from the
present when interacting with white law enforcement officers because some
white police officers bring a Jim Crow attitude with them whenever they
interact with any black person for any reason.59
President Obama suggested that Cambridge police officer, Officer
Sergeant Crowley, may have "acted stupidly" by arresting Professor Gates
after it was determined that Professor Gates had not committed a crime,
even if his entrance to his home was under rather suspicious
circumstances.60 In order for an officer to conduct a reasonable search or
ingrained in the minds of many law enforcement officers and has become a part of their
standard operating procedures.").
55. See id. (suggesting "[a] holistic approach to remedying racial profiling has to be
developed to address . . . conduct by law enforcement officials").
56. See id. (advocating a holistic, "frontal attack [on eradicating racial profiling of
African Americans] must occur at all levels of government, the judiciary, by private citizens,
and various community and civil rights organizations").
57. See generally Hendrix, supra note 33, at 696 ("[I]ncidents of racial profiling have
a long-lasting impact on their victims.") (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THREAT AND
HUMILIATION: RACIAL PROFILING, DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 21 (2004)). "African-Americans have reported feelings of depression, helplessness,
and humiliation. As a result of being subject to racial profiling, African-Americans have
also reported a diminished trust in law enforcement and a reluctance to seek the assistance of
law enforcement." Id.
58. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (discussing possible reasons for
Gates’ reaction as well as the errors on the part of Crowley).
59. See generally Weatherspoon, supra note 50, at 724 ("[F]or African-Americans,
[equal protection] rights are merely a mirage of what white Americans receive and take for
granted . . . ."). "Too often, race is the determinative factor used by law enforcement officers
to justify a stop and search of African-Americans." Id.
60. See Cooper, supra note 3, at A20 (acknowledging that President Obama initially
said "that the Cambridge police acted stupidly in arresting somebody when there was already
proof that they were in their own home"); see also Peter Baker & Helen Cooper, A
Presidential Pitfall: Speaking One’s Mind, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at A3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/us/politics/27memo.html?_r=1&ref=helene_cooper
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seizure of an individual, he must satisfy the requirements established in the
Fourth Amendment.61 The Fourth Amendment guarantees people freedom
in their persons and houses from an unreasonable search or seizure, but it
does not prohibit an officer from conducting a reasonable investigation of
possible criminal activity.62
III. The Initial Questioning of Professor Gates is Permitted Under the
Fourth Amendment Because Reasonable Suspicion Exists
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court gave police the authority to
conduct an investigatory stop to briefly seize or detain a person when
there is a reasonable suspicion "that criminal activity . . . [is] afoot." 63
An investigatory stop occurs when an officer detains an individual for
a limited time to dispel his or her suspicion of criminal activity.64 "The
Fourth Amendment is not, of course, a guarantee against all searches
and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures." 65
In order to decide whether an investigative detention is unreasonable,
courts should be guided by common sense and ordinary human
experience.66 The Supreme Court in United States v. Sharpe67 and in
(last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice) (stating that President Obama "declared that the police in Cambridge, Mass.,
had ‘acted stupidly’ in arresting a prominent black scholar at his own home").
61. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Brendlin v. California and
its definition of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure requirements).
62. See Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1145 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing that
one exception to Fourth Amendment protection is probable cause "based on the totality of
the circumstances, and requires reasonably trustworthy information that would lead a
reasonable officer to believe that the person about to be seized has committed or is about to
commit a crime" (quoting Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1116 (10th Cir. 2007))).
63. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that "a police officer [who]
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous . . . [may] conduct a carefully limited search").
64. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) ("In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30 (1968), we held that the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative
purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal
activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.").
65. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).
66. See id. at 685 (balancing the rights of the individual under investigation with the
law enforcement interest in effectively achieving the purposes of a stop).
67. See id. at 675, 688 (holding that a twenty minute investigatory stop is not
unconstitutional if law enforcement officers act diligently to achieve the purpose of the
stop).
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Terry v. Ohio68 articulated a twofold inquiry for judging the
reasonableness of an investigative stop.69 Under this inquiry, a court
will consider "whether the officer’s action was justified at its
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."70
If officers are justified in making an investigative stop—to detain
and ask a person questions in the first place, and subsequently work to
dispel or confirm their suspicion of criminal activity, which should be
the only reason why they instituted the stop—then the stop will
typically be considered reasonable.71 Thus, the investigative stop will
not be considered unconstitutional.72 A brief investigatory stop by a
police officer does not require probable cause.73 When a police officer
is making a custodial arrest, the officer needs probable cause to believe
that a crime has occurred or is about to take place. Sergeant Crowley
did not need probable cause to approach Professor Gates at his house
because Sergeant Crowley’s brief questioning of Professor Gates was
permissible.74 Sergeant Crowley possessed reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity at Professor Gates home.75 Reasonable suspicion is
satisfied when there is "specific and articulable" evidence of criminal
activity.76 The criminal activity giving rise to the investigatory stop
may have previously occurred or is one that has not occurred but is
68. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 8 (stating that the Court should evaluate whether the officer
acted reasonably under the circumstances in determining the legality of the investigative
stop).
69. See Sharpe, 470 U.S at 682 (referring to the "dual inquiry for evaluating the
reasonableness of an investigative stop").
70. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
71. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (acknowledging that a
search is presumed to be constitutional if it is justifiable at its inception and reasonable in its
scope).
72. See id. at 686 (holding that an investigative stop satisfying the two-pronged
analysis will be considered constitutional).
73. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10 (distinguishing between a "stop" and an "arrest"; the
latter requires probable cause, whereas the former does not).
74. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (summarizing the series of events leading to
Sergeant Crowley’s reasonable belief that a crime was being committed and that a
preliminary investigation was necessary).
75. See id. (describing Professor Gates’ behavior as suspicious, especially in light of
Mrs. Whalen’s concerned telephone call).
76. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("In justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.").
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likely to occur.77 In forming their suspicion, courts have allowed
officers to draw from their personal knowledge or cumulative
information made available to them through a reliable third party.78
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Watson held that informants
could give rise to reasonable suspicion so long as the information
revealed had some indication of reliability. 79
During the duration of the investigative stop, police officers are
limited to "reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the
suspicion" of criminal activity.80 Officers must have a reasonable suspicion
that the individual is engaging or has engaged in criminal activity as a prerequisite to conducting the investigative stop.81
Mrs. Whalen’s telephone call provided the officers with sufficient
evidence to establish a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may have
occurred or could occur.82 The officers had a reasonable suspicion to
conduct an investigatory questioning of Professor Gates regarding alleged
criminal activity.83 The relevant facts pertaining to the Professor GatesSergeant Crowley situation are: 1) Ms. Whalen made a call to the
Cambridge police describing a possible break-in at Professor Gates place of
residence; 2) Sergeant Crowley along with his fellow officers were
dispatched to Professor Gates’ home; 3) Sergeant Crowley arrived at
Professor Gates’ residence and through the front door observed "an older
black male;" 4) Professor Gates initially refused to step out on the porch to
speak to Sergeant Crowley, but after Sergeant Crowley identified himself as
a police officer, Professor Gates opened his front door; 5) Sergeant Crowley
asked Professor Gates to show him some form of identification to quickly
dispel his suspicion that Professor Gates was the "possible intruder"; and 6)
Professor Gates initially refused but eventually submitted to Sergeant
77. See United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that,
under precedent, an investigatory stop is legal if "an officer has reasonable suspicion that a
crime has previously been committed by an individual").
78. See id. (allowing law enforcement officers to rely on their own experience in the
field to form a suspicion that a crime is being or has been committed).
79. See United States v. Watson, 558 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that tips
can provide the basis for an investigative stop in certain circumstances).
80. Hughes, 517 F.3d at 1016.
81. See id. ("Reasonable suspicion must be supported by ‘specific and articulable
facts.’" (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)).
82. See discussion supra Part II (applying the Hughes and Terry framework to the
facts surrounding Prof. Gates’ arrest).
83. See id. (arguing that the phone call, combined with Professor Gates’ behavior,
gave the officers a reasonable suspicion that Gates was involved in criminal activity).
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Crowley’s request for identification by giving his Harvard identification
card to Sergeant Crowley inside Professor Gates’ home.84
When Mrs. Whalen made the call informing the dispatcher of a
possible break-in at the residence, she gave the officers "concrete and
articulable" facts that formed the basis of their reasonable suspicion.85
Armed with reasonable suspicion, the officers were well within the scope of
their duties under the Fourth Amendment to investigate the risk of criminal
activity at Professor Gates’ residence.86 Not every questioning of a resident
at his home invokes Fourth Amendment protection.87 Only an unreasonable
seizure of a person invokes Fourth Amendment protections.88 Courts have
held that a reasonable detention occurs in the commission of an
investigatory stop when the defendant’s submission to the officer’s show of
authority results in a brief interference with their freedom of movement but
not amounting to a full custodial arrest.89 Because show of authority by a
police officer when interacting with an individual can occur with or without
the use of physical force before a custodial arrest, courts must consider the
circumstances surrounding the submission by an individual to the
investigating officer.90
When Sergeant Crowley arrived at Professor Gates’ home and initially
asked Professor Gates to step outside, Professor Gates’ refusal may have
given Sergeant Crowley, under the circumstances, enough reasonable
suspicion necessary to continue conducting investigatory questioning of
Professor Gates.91 The mere fact that Sergeant Crowley asked Professor
84. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (summarizing the events leading up to Professor
Gates’ arrest).
85. Id.
86. See Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) ("[P]olice should be allowed to ‘stop’ a
person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected with
criminal activity.").
87. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) ("The Fourth Amendment
is not, of course, a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable
searches and seizures.").
88. See id. (differentiating between general searches and seizures and unreasonable
searches and seizures; only the latter triggers Fourth Amendment protection).
89. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (holding that the suspect
was not detained until he was physically tackled because the suspect did not comply with the
officer’s initial showing of authority).
90. See id. at 626 (presenting a range of hypothetical situations to demonstrate that the
court should consider the circumstances of each case in determining whether a suspect has
submitted to law enforcement officers).
91. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (describing the events leading up to Professor Gates’
arrest).
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Gates to open the door alone is insufficient to establish an arrest because
Sergeant Crowley had not "restrained the liberty of a citizen" enough to
constitute a seizure.92 If Professor Gates, as a reasonable person, were free
to end his encounter with Sergeant Crowley, the communicative encounter
would not constitute an unreasonable seizure.93 The investigative stop
would start the moment Professor Gates submitted to Sergeant Crowley’s
"show of authority" by opening the door to his house because a reasonable
person under the circumstances "would not feel free to terminate the
encounter."94
Professor Gates may have opened his door to Sergeant Crowley
because a reasonable person in Professor Gates’ position may have believed
he was not free to end the visit until after Sergeant Crowley entered
Professor Gates home to dismiss his suspicion of criminal activity on the
part of Professor Gates.95 Sergeant Crowley’s duty to investigate the
situation ended after Professor Gates provided him with his Harvard
identification because appropriate identification should have removed any
reasonable suspicion that Professor Gates was a "possible criminal intruder"
in his own home.96
The initial arrival and investigatory questioning of Professor Gates to
determine whether he was the possible criminal intruder that Mrs. Whalen
reported to the dispatcher was a reasonable use of Sergeant Crowley’s
policing power, because Sergeant Crowley possessed reasonable evidence
that a burglary had occurred or was likely to occur at Professor Gates’
residence by unknown suspects.97 The fact that Sergeant Crowley came to
Professor Gates’ home because he had reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity taking place challenges the argument that Professor Gates was
initially targeted because he was black. Racial profiling occurs when an
officer violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches or seizures when he does not possess a reasonable suspicion
stemming from "concrete and coherent" evidence and instead uses race as a
92. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980).
93. See United States v. Jones, 562 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 2009) (indicating that a
search becomes a seizure when a reasonable person believes that he is not free to end the
encounter).
94. Id. at 774.
95. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (noting that Professor Gates opened the front door to
speak with law enforcement officers).
96. Id.
97. See id. (revealing Sergeant Crowley’s reasonable belief that a burglary had
occurred or was in progress at the Gates’ home based on Mrs. Whalen’s observations).

320

17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 305 (2011)

factor while targeting a person for investigative purposes.98 When racial
stereotyping is the predominant factor in the officer’s encounter with the
target, racial profiling occurs.99 Because the Cambridge police were
responding to a phone call indicating reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity from Mrs. Whalen without any reference to the suspect being
African American, it can be argued that the initial arrival to Professor
Gates’ home may not have involved racial profiling. In Professor Gates’
narrative, police initially arrived at his house to investigate possible
criminal conduct.100 The Cambridge police were dispatched to Professor
Gates’ home after Mrs. Whalen made a call to 911 to report a break-in.101
Throughout Mrs. Whalen’s conversation with the 911 dispatcher, she tried
to avoid making race a factor in her description of possible criminal
intruders; however, she ultimately described the intruders as possibly
Hispanic after being probed by the 911 dispatcher.102 Once Sergeant
Crowley arrived at Professor Gates’ home as an officer of the law, he was
acting within the scope of his job to investigate the possibility of criminal
activity inside the house because he received information creating a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was taking place inside of
Professor Gates’ home.103
The decision by Sergeant Crowley to arrest Professor Gates for
disorderly conduct is not reasonably linked to the suspicion of criminal
activity that initially made Professor Gates a reasonable Fourth Amendment
target of the investigation.104 It can be argued that both Sergeant Crowley
98. See FREDRICKSON & SILJANDER, supra note 45, at 46 ("[A] stop that is made
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and therefore is without legal basis, is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.").
99. See id. at 15 ("Racial profiling is a term that is generally understood to mean
enforcement action on the part of police officers that is motivated more by racial bias than
by any reasonable suspicion or probable cause that may exist under the circumstances.").
100. See Nemeth, supra note 10, at 1 ("The brouhaha erupted when Cambridge Police
Sgt. James Crowley investigated a potential burglary at the home of Harvard professor
Henry Louis Gates Jr.").
101. See id. (identifying Mrs. Whalen as the concerned neighbor who notified the
police of a potential robbery at the Gates’ home).
102. See Frank Rich, Small Beer, Big Hangover, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2009, at A8,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/opinion/02rich.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice)
(discussing the lack of racial identification in Mrs. Whalen’s report to the police).
103. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (demonstrating that Sgt. Crowley formed a
reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed or was in commission at the Gates’
home after Mrs. Whalen described a man attempting to break into the house).
104. See id. (demonstrating that Sgt. Crowley arrested Professor Gates for disorderly
conduct that occurred during their confrontation, not for actions connected to the suspected
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and Professor Gates "acted unreasonably" or "overreacted."105 Professor
Gates and Sergeant Crowley may have allowed default stereotyping to
cloud their respective judgments. Default stereotyping occurs when the
negative preconceived notions that an individual brings to the table when
interacting with an individual from a specific racial or ethnic group is a
predominant factor in analyzing a given situation.
Professor Gates, a distinguished African American Scholar at Harvard,
one of the country’s most respected universities, may have engaged in
default stereotyping speech by challenging the authority of Officer Sergeant
Crowley to investigate a crime by immediately assuming that he was being
targeted for criminal activity only because he was "a black man in
America," who happened to live in a predominately white neighborhood in
Cambridge.106 On the other hand, Sergeant Crowley may have engaged in
default stereotyping speech under the circumstances by stating in error that
Mrs. Whalen referred to an African-American male, as the suspected
criminal intruder attempting to unlawfully enter into Professor Gates’
residence, in his police report.107 Who knows what actually prompted
Sergeant Crowley to make false statements in his police report by
indicating that Mrs. Whalen had identified the "suspected criminal" as
black?108 It is possible that Sergeant Crowley was trying to avoid a later
charge that Professor Gates was targeted because of his race by falsely and
unreasonably stating in his police report that Mrs. Whalen had identified the
suspects as black in her 911 call.109
robbery).
105. See Fletcher & Shear, supra note 9, at A1 (quoting President Obama, who
described both individuals as acting unreasonably).
106. Krissah Thompson, Scholar Says Arrest Will Lead Him to Explore Race in
Criminal Justice, WASH. POST, July 22, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/21/AR2009072101771.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
107. See id. (quoting Professor Gates as stating, "if [Mrs. Whalen] saw someone
tomorrow that looked like they were breaking in, I would want her to call 911). Professor
Gates continued:
I would want the police to come. What I would not want is to be presumed
guilty. That’s what the deal was. It didn’t matter how I was dressed. It didn’t
matter how I talked. It didn’t matter how I comported myself. That man was
convinced that I was guilty. Id.
108. See Rich, supra note 102, at A8 (acknowledging that there is no way of knowing
whether race played a role in Sergeant Crowley’s decision to arrest Professor Gates).
109. See id. ("In his police report, Sgt. James Crowley portrayed Whalen as a racial
profiler by saying she had told him that the two men at Gates’ door were black.").
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When Professor Gates and Sergeant Crowley return to their regular
activities after their meeting with President Obama, one commentator
considers whether the nation will learn anything from the incident.110
President Obama correctly observed that the dispute between Professor
Gates and Sergeant Crowley provided Americans with a "teaching
moment."111 The lesson from this is that presumptions based on default
racial stereotypes by either an African American or a professional white
police officer are harmful to race relations in America. While making a 911
call, Mrs. Whalen as a solid citizen believed she could help fight crime
without engaging in either race profiling or default stereotyping.112
IV. The Disorderly Conduct Charges Against Professor Gates Were
Dismissed Because Hostile Speech is Protected
Sergeant Crowley may have acted unwisely in the minutes after he
responded to a possible break-in by converting his investigation into an
unconstitutional disorderly conduct arrest because he was insulted by
Professor Gates’ offensive speech.113 The First Amendment Free Speech
Clause protects any offensive speech Professor Gates may have directed at
Sergeant Crowley during their conversation.114
The Courts have long been concerned with communications
between American citizens and police officers. In City of Houston v.
Hill,115 the Supreme Court warned officers of the law that "the First
Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and
challenge directed at police officers." 116 The Court in City of Houston
deemed it an unconstitutional act to arrest someone for merely verbally

110. See Kalson, supra note 11, at A1 (considering the potential lessons to be learned
on both sides of the incident following a meeting with President Obama).
111. Fletcher & Shear, supra note 9, at A1 (quoting Obama as referring to the incident
as a "teachable moment").
112. See Rich, supra note 102, at A8 (noting that Mrs. Whalen’s 911 call did not refer
to race).
113. See Cooper, supra note 3, at A20 (noting that President Obama disapproved of
Sergeant Crowley’s decision to arrest Prof. Gates after it was clear that he was in his own
home).
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that Congress shall make no law "abridging the
freedom of speech").
115. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 472 (1987) (holding that the First
Amendment protects expressive disorderly speech).
116. Id. at 461.
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opposing and/or interrupting a police officer in furtherance of his
duties.117 Courts have recognized the freedom of citizens when
communicating with government officials to speak their mind, ask
questions, criticize and express their opinion, which is a substantial
right granted to every citizen through the First Amendment.118 The
inventory of unprotected speech involves incitements to violence, libel,
obscenity, fighting words and commercial advertising.119 The first move in
analyzing every First Amendment problem is to examine the checklist of
"unprotected" categories of speech to find out whether any category
includes the communication in question.120
In the present case, between Sergeant Crowley and Professor Gates, it
is undisputed that words were exchanged between the two men at Professor
Gates’ residence.121 The specific words that were exchanged may not ever
be known, but according to Sergeant Crowley’s police report, Professor
Gates was arrested because of the "tumultuous behavior Professor Gates
exhibited in and out of his residence."122 Sergeant Crowley believed it was
necessary to arrest and charge Professor Gates with disorderly conduct, but
the charge was later dismissed because there was not enough probable
cause.123 If the tumultuous behavior or disorderly conduct charge was in
reference to an alleged verbal outburst by Professor Gates when he accused
Sergeant Crowley of being a racist cop, it was necessary and proper for
public officials in Cambridge to subsequently drop the charges against
Professor Gates. As a general rule, the First Amendment protects your right
117. See id. (holding that the Constitution protects mere verbal opposition to actions of
law enforcement officials).
118. See id. ("[A] certain amount of expressive disorder not only is inevitable in a
society committed to individual freedom, but must itself be protected if that freedom would
survive.").
119. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of
Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1992); see also Keith Werhan, The
Liberalization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA L. REV. 51, 53–66
(1994) (placing First Amendment decisions in context to assess the Court’s evolving views
on free speech).
120. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975) (arguing
that the threshold question in addressing free speech issues is whether the expression fits into
a protected category of expression).
121. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (documenting the conversation between Sergeant
Crowley and Professor Gates).
122. Id.
123. See id. (revealing Sergeant Crowley’s state of mind when he decided to arrest
Professor Gates and that he believed Professor Gates’ behavior was creating a disturbance).
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to call a police officer a racist cop.124 In my view, offensive speech directed
to a police officer is high-risk speech that is likely to lead to your unlawful
arrest or other harm. Although Professor Gates yelled and called Sergeant
Crowley a racist cop, his offensive speech does not fall within any of the
four exceptions to the First Amendment’s protection for free speech.
One who unwisely directs offensive speech against armed police
officers is protected under the First Amendment, unless his speech is
"directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless actions and is likely to
produce such actions."125 In plain words, accusing a police officer of being
a racist cop while on the front porch of one’s residence is not likely to fall
within the Supreme Court’s definition of unprotected speech. Since the
Supreme Court has recognized the use of the expletive "fuck the draft"
while wearing a jacket in the Los Angles Court House to protest war is
protected speech under the First Amendment, it is probably permissible
under the First Amendment to call a police officer a racist at your home as
an act of either historical protest or clear and present anger without danger
is protected offensive expression.126 Professor Daniel A. Farber has
appropriately described Cohen v. California as an important case that stated
unambiguously that offensiveness was not sufficient to categorize speech as
fighting words.127 In order to qualify as fighting words, the speech should
be directed at the listener and reasonably expected to arouse a violent
response.128 Federal courts have condemned the using of "disorderly
conduct" charges as a way to abridge an individual’s freedom of speech.129
Disorderly conduct charges are proper only when an individual uses such
speech to incite immediate lawless action and the speech is likely to

124. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (protecting an individual’s
right to use disorderly speech during an arrest or investigation).
125. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
126. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that the government may
not criminalize the use or display of offensive language).
127. See Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in
American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 921 n.19 (2009) (noting that mere
offensiveness is not sufficient to raise an expression to the level of fighting words).
128. See id.
129. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (stating that the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech forbids states to punish language not within "narrowly
limited classes of speech"). In Hess, appellant argued that Indiana’s disorderly conduct
statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 105. The court found that Hess’s use of an
expletive was neither directed at the arresting officer nor directed towards inciting or
producing imminent lawless action. Id. at 108. The State could therefore not punish Hess’s
words on the grounds that they had a "tendency to lead to violence." Id. at 109.
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produce such action.130 Prosecution for actions amounting to offensive
speech without more is prohibited by the free speech clause of the First
Amendment.131 An arrest for simply using offensive words is unlawful,
unless, the speech is "shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of
a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience,
annoyance or unrest."132 Since the conversation between Sergeant Crowley
and citizen Professor Gates does not amount to the type of substantive evil
that escapes First Amendment scrutiny, Professor Gates had the First
Amendment right to call Sergeant Crowley a racist cop just before his
foreseeable unlawful arrest by Sergeant Crowley.133 My Black experience
informs me that if a black male calls a white police officer a racist cop in a
face-to-face confrontation the officer will quickly find a legitimate or pretextual reason to arrest his black accuser that has a plausible justification.134
V. A False Police Report Under Massachusetts Law is Not a Crime Unless
it Contains a Material Matter
In arresting a highly respected African-American historian who
teaches at Harvard, Sergeant Crowley may have realized for the first time,
while preparing his police report, that he had "waded into the politically
charged swamp of race in America"135 and that his interaction with
Professor Gates is only politically correct if Mrs. Whalen described the
potential criminal intruders at Professor Gates’ home as black.136 On
130. See id. at 108–09 (citing the standard established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
131. See id. (noting that the State can only limit an individual’s speech if it incites
immediate lawless action and is likely to produce the action).
132. See Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (discussing the exceptions to the
First Amendment protection of freedom of speech).
133. See Hess, 414 U.S. at 108–09 (finding that use of an expletive did not have a
tendency to incite violence and therefore, the State could not punish the words); see also
CROWLEY, supra note 12 (stating that the action leading to an arrest was merely the
accusation that the investigating officer was a racist).
134. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the subjective Black experience).
135. Editorial, The Crass Politics of Race, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 12, 2010, at
A10, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20100111-Editorial-Thecrass-politics-of-6915.ece (discussing the use of race in American politics) (last visited Mar.
27, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
136. See discussion supra Part III (discussing that the caller actually identified the
intruders as possibly being Hispanic, but that the police report states the caller identified the
intruders as two black men).
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Thursday, July 16, 2009, Professor Gates of Cambridge was arrested at
Ware Street for demonstrating loud public behavior.137 The loud public
behavior was directed at a Sergeant Crowley who was at Ware Street to
investigate the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.138 Sergeant
Crowley heard a police broadcast of a break-in, in progress at the Ware
Street address, Professor Gates’ home.139 Sergeant Crowley said, "Due to
my proximity, I responded."140 After Sergeant Crowley arrived at the Ware
Street address he radioed Ms. Whalen, the white female caller, and asked
her to meet him at the front door of the residence.141 While Whalen was
standing on the sidewalk in front of Professor Gates’ residence, she
informed Sergeant Crowley that she was the person who made the call.142
According to Sergeant Crowley, while standing on the sidewalk, "Whalen
told me that she saw two black males on the porch of Ware Street, and one
of them was trying to force entry into the home."143
It should not come as a surprise if Sergeant Crowley took his clue
from Professor Gates in trying to utilize the race card to his advantage in
describing their interaction in his police report.144 Sergeant Crowley’s
police report strongly suggests Professor Gates expressly invoked the race
card before Sergeant Crowley.145 After Sergeant Crowley asked Professor
Gates to step out on the porch and speak with him, Professor Gates said,
"No I will not."146 Professor Gates then demanded to know the identity of
Sergeant Crowley.147 Sergeant Crowley told Professor Gates that he was
Sergeant Crowley from the Cambridge Police and that he was investigating
a report of a break-in, in progress at the residence.148 While he was making
this statement, Professor Gates opened his front door and asked whether he

137. CROWLEY, supra note 12.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. CROWLEY, supra note 12.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. (describing how Professor Gates asked the officer if he was being
investigated because he was black).
145. See id. (describing how Professor Gates told a person on the other end of the
telephone that he was "dealing with a racist police officer").
146. CROWLEY, supra note 12.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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was being investigated because he was "a black man in America."149 By
accusing the police officer of possessing a criminal suspicion simply
because he was a black man in America, Professor Gates was issuing
Sergeant an open invitation to play the race card game.150 Professor Gates
perceived that he might have a tactical advantage based on the intersection
of race and class because of his professional status as a Harvard
professor.151 One can only make an educated guess as to why Professor
Gates used the race card so quickly in this rather routine investigation of
apparent suspicious criminal activity152 Professor Gates may have utilized
the race card in a routine fashion when interacting with Sergeant Crowley
because his understanding of the history of American race relations reveals
that he might have a politically correct advantage by accusing Sergeant
Crowley of acting like a racist.153 "Race remains the third rail of American
politics because politicians wield it as a blunt weapon for convenient
political advantage."154 America deserves better than the same old heated
race card games from Professor Gates and Sergeant Crowley, as well as its
two major political parties.155 Unfortunately, "the race and ‘greater sin’
cards are being played by Republicans and Democrats."156 In the situation
involving Professor Gates and Sergeant Crowley, President Obama became
a diplomat to control the race card damage created by the controversy.157
After Professor Gates opened his door, Sergeant Crowley then asked
Professor Gates if there was someone else in the residence.158 Professor
Gates yelled and told Sergeant Crowley that it was none of his business
who was in the residence and accused Sergeant Crowley of being a racist

149. Id.
150. See id. (stating that Professor Gates was the first party to invoke the issue of race
verbally).
151. See Thompson, supra note 2, at A4 (discussing Professor Gates’ background as a
scholar in the history of racism).
152. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (stating that Gates brought up race almost
immediately upon answering the door).
153. See Thompson, supra note 2, at A4 (providing an account of Gates discussing his
in-depth knowledge of the history of racism).
154. Editorial, The Crass Politics Of Race, supra note 135, at A10.
155. See id. (discussing how the Democratic and Republican Parties utilize the issue of
race).
156. Id.
157. See Kalson, supra note 11, at A1 (stating that President Obama prepared to bring
the parties together for discusssion after the incident).
158. CROWLEY, supra note 12.

328

17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 305 (2011)

police officer.159 After Professor Gates invoked the race card continuously
throughout his encounter with Sergeant Crowley, one can better understand
why Sergeant Crowley felt compelled to retaliate with his own perceived
race card advantage by stating in his police report that he was not just
looking for any criminals but a black criminal, which would give him a
perceived race card advantage.160 An allegation by Sergeant Crowley’s
police report that witness Whalen told him the suspected criminal intruders
were black, if false, could have legal implications for Sergeant Crowley if a
charge is filed against him alleging that he filed a false police report under
Massachusetts law.161
On April 16, 1985, Edwin W. Driscoll reported a stolen car.162 On May
10, 1985, the defendant located Driscoll’s car and prepared an incident
report.163 An incident report is a form used by the Boston police department to
make a written record of any incident involving a police officer.164 The officer
is asked to describe the nature of the incident in the report.165 However, when a
police officer provides information in the incident report, he should not provide
false information.166 The Commonwealth said the incident report was false
because it wrongly suggested that proper authorization was given to tow the
car.167 Boston police Captain Mary Evans’s testimony strongly suggested a
reasonable police officer in the position of the defendant police officer should
know that information in the report was not correct and false.168
The Massachusetts Court concluded that Evans’ testimony did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant recognized that his report was

159. Id.
160. See discussion supra Part III (discussing how Sergeant Crowley falsely related in
the police report that the suspected intruders were black).
161. See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 626 N.E.2d 12, 12–13 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)
(stating that an officer or employee of the Commonwealth can be subject to punishment for
filing a false police report under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 268, § 6A).
162. Id. at 747.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. (stating that inquiry number four of the incident report requires the "type of
incident" being reported).
166. See id. at 747–48 (discussing that Massachusetts General Laws ch. 268, § 6A
forbids an officer from providing false information in a police report).
167. See id. at 749 (stating the Commonwealth’s position that by stating that the officer
towed the car which he had "recovered," there was a suggestion that authorization had taken
place).
168. See id. (discussing the testimony of Captain Mary Evans and her usage of the term
"recovered").
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false on a material fact.169 The Commonwealth made the case that the
declaration was material since the "effect of the report was to cover up a crime
committed by Roslindale Motors in towing the car without authorization and to
allow the company to bill the motor vehicle’s owner for its services."170 Under
these circumstances, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals concluded the
evidence does not allow a reasonable inference that the defendant knew his
statement was false regarding a material matter.171
The Massachusetts Constitution provides for the equality of all of its
Under
inhabitants by declaring racial discrimination illegal. 172
Massachusetts’s law, race profiling is defined as "the practice of detaining [or
stopping] a suspect based on a broad set of criteria which casts suspicion on an
entire class of people without any individualized suspicion of the particular
person being stopped."173 Under the Massachusetts Constitution everyone is
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures.174 An alleged false
statement regarding the race of the suspect, as reported in the police incident
report prepared by Sergeant Crowley, is a plausible material fact and should
expose him to a criminal investigation under the rationale of Commonwealth v.
Kelley.175 If there is any evidence that the incident report was employed with
the goal of implementing unauthorized racial profiling, then Sergeant
Crowley’s false statement regarding race in the incident report is false on a
material matter.176 From a hypothetical perspective, even if Sergeant Crowley
169. See id. (stating that there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant
knew his statement was false in a material matter).
170. Id. at 750.
171. See id. (discussing the lack of evidence showing that the defendant knew his
statement was materially false). The Court continued:
Because the evidence does not provide sufficient basis for a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his statement was false and that he
knew it to be false in a material matter, his motion for a required finding of not
guilty should have been allowed. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is
reversed, the finding is set aside, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court
for entry of a judgment of acquittal. Id.
172. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1 (West 2010) (stating that no one
shall be denied equality under the law on the basis of race).
173. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, n.1 (Mass. 2008).
174. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CONST. pt. 1, art. 14 (West 2010) (stating that every
person has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures).
175. See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 626 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (holding
that there was not sufficient evidence that the police officer knew using the word
"recovered" in the police report was false in a material matter).
176. See id. (stating that there needs to be evidence to provide a sufficient basis for a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew his statement was false).
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engaged in race profiling under the circumstances involving Professor Gates,
the Massachusetts Court of Appeals is likely to conclude that the evidence does
not allow a reasonable inference that Sergeant Crowley knew his statement was
false regarding a material matter.177 If Sergeant Crowley possessed a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity178 by Professor Gates during his initial
encounter with Professor Gates, one could argue that he did not engage in race
profiling. Furthermore, any misrepresentation regarding Mrs. Whalen
providing the racial identity of a potential suspect in the incident report is not
likely to be considered as a material fact on the issue of race profiling.179 In a
civil rights action filed by white students against Dartmouth College alleging
their suspension was racially motivated,180 the federal court of appeals held,
"merely juxtaposing the fact of one’s race with an instance of discrimination is
insufficient to state a claim"181 of racial discrimination. Similarly, simply
juxtaposing race with an alleged false statement regarding the racial identity of
a suspect in a police incident report by Sergeant Crowley may be considered as
insufficient to prove that Sergeant Crowley committed a crime by making a
false statement regarding a material fact in order to cover up the illegal act of
racial profiling.182
Raymond Scott sued defendants after his arrest for disorderly conduct on
a theory of racial profiling after the credit card company was wrongly informed
that that plaintiff was suspected of engaging in stolen credit card use.183
Assuming that race was the dominant factor in why Scott was a target at the
Plaza shopping mall, he faces an uphill battle in proving that the race profiling
was illegal184 because the discriminatory intent proof requirement benefits the
177. See id. at 751 (finding that there needs to be enough evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the police officer knew his statement was false).
178. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 37 (1968) (noting that while the police officer did
not have probable cause to arrest, he had reasonable suspicion to stop, accost the defendant,
and question him).
179. See Kelley, 626 N.E.2d 12 at 15 (stating that an officer must know that a statement
was false as to a material fact).
180. See Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1989)
(describing the complaint as stating that the President refused to meet with white students
but met with an opposing group of black students).
181. See id. at 19 (stating that a "fact-specific allegation of a causal link between
defendants’ conduct and plaintiffs’ race" is necessary for a count to stand).
182. See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 626 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)
(establishing the need for strong evidence of an officer’s knowledge of a false material fact).
183. See Scott v. Macy’s East, Inc., No. Civ.A.01-10323-NG, 2002 WL 31439745, at
*1–2 (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 2002) (stating that mall officials identified the defendant as a stolen
credit card suspect because of his behavior in a department store).
184. See id. at *7 (stating that the law requires a measure of proof and the claimant bears the
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defendant regardless of the race of the alleged victim.185 In a complaint
alleging that Sergeant Crowley falsely stated that Mrs. Whalen identified the
suspects as black, Professor Gates nevertheless faces an uphill battle because of
the heavy burden of proof generally placed on individuals alleging selective
law enforcement based on racial profiling.186
VI. Conclusion
The arrest of Professor Gates by Sergeant Crowley teaches us that
racial profiling in the criminal justice system remains a hot button issue.187
African Americans are the primary targets of racial profiling in America.188
Because of their race profiling experience, it should not be surprising that
African Americans are more likely to accept a charge of racial profiling
from a black Harvard professor than many of their white friends.189 On the
other hand, most white Americans who have not experienced racial
profiling are more likely to accept a white police sergeant’s allegation that
he arrested the Harvard professor because he engaged in disorderly conduct
and not because of his race.
The lesson from the narrative involving Professor Gates and Sergeant
Crowley may be that on the issue of race profiling, many blacks and many
whites probably identify with a different worldview.190 In order to close the
racial divide on the issue of racial profiling, it is necessary to provide
sensitive training to all Americans. The racial profiling sensitive training
should include a joint presentation from the perspective of the traditional
victims of race targeting and police officers charged with enforcing our
burden of proof).
185. See id. at *6–7 (stating that the claimant bears the burden of production and proof and the
defaults favor the defendant).
186. See Melissa Whitney, The Statistical Evidence of Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops and
Searches: Rethinking the Use of Statistics to Prove Discriminatory Intent, 49 B.C. L. REV. 263, 282–
83 (2008) (discussing the difficulties in meeting the burden of proof in both equal protection claims
due to the unavailability of data in specific circumstances).
187. See discussion supra Part II (discussing racial profiling in general); see also Kalson, supra
note 11, at A1 (discussing the importance for President Obama to address racial profiling in this
specific instance).
188. See Hendrix, supra note 33, at 3 (stating that African Americans have been the primary
targets of racial profiling).
189. See discussion supra Part II (discussing racial profiling and how African Americans have
been the primary targets).
190. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the "subjective Black experience" as a result of
the history of racial profiling and racism in general).

332

17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 305 (2011)

laws fairly and impartially. This joint race sensitive training could be
conducted before churches, religious groups, community organizations,
civic organizations, and business groups. The incident involving Professor
Gates and Sergeant Crowley shows that every person living in America
should be given an opportunity to receive sensitivity training as a proactive
measure to help us all learn how to get along. Finally, race profiling
sensitive training should be offered to all people living in America so that
we may learn how to avoid the default stereotyping of people from other
racial or ethnic groups. Default stereotyping occurs when the negative
preconceived notions that an individual brings to the table when interacting
with an individual from a specific racial or ethnic group is a predominant
factor in analyzing a given situation. Default stereotyping is dangerous
because it can cloud our judgment and lead to racial profiling.

